Here's the first part of the new report: "The story of Bt Cotton in Andhra Pradesh: Erratic Processes and Results" just published by the Centre for Sustainable Agriculture, Secunderabad

CONTENT
-The Story of Bt Cotton in India and in Andhra Pradesh
-The Pre-Commercial Release Story
-The First Year of Approved Commercial Cultivation: 2002-03
[the rest of the report to follow in part 2]
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The Story of Bt Cotton in India and in Andhra Pradesh [PART 1]

The hype and propaganda put out by the companies about the unquestionable superior performance of Bollgard Bt Cotton has been proven false yet again. For a second year in three years, in 2004-05 also the government of Andhra Pradesh decided that farmers who have incurred losses by growing Bollgard Bt Cotton need to be compensated by the company. In the year 2002-03, the first year of its commercial cultivation, the then Minister for Agriculture had to announce that Bollgard performance was less than satisfactory and that farmers would be compensated.

In the year 2004-05, hundreds of farmers across different districts went on an agitation in Andhra Pradesh demanding compensation of at least twenty thousand rupees an acre for incurring losses with Bollgard Bt Cotton cultivation. Under the "MoU system" (Memorandum of Understanding between the government of Andhra Pradesh and certain seed companies for self certification), compensation has been awarded by district level committees headed by the Joint Directors of Agriculture (called the "JDA Committees") where the companies involved (Monsanto-Mahyco or Raasi) were asked to pay compensation to aggrieved farmers. The companies decided to contest the awards, predictably. However, the awarding of compensation by the JDA Committees is a statement in itself about the performance of Bt Cotton.

District, variety and area of loss for which complaint was lodged

JDA Committee's decision

Krishna MECH 12 90.33 hectares District Level MoU Committee passed an award of Rs. 244,400/-. The Company appealed to the State Level Monitoring Committee (which reportedly upheld the award, as per reliable sources in the department of agriculture)

Krishna MECH 12 4.82 hectares District level MoU Committee passed an award of Rs 3750/-. The Company appealed to the State Level Monitoring Committee (which reportedly upheld the award, as per reliable sources in the department of agriculture)

Mahabubnagar MECH 12 80 hectares The fields were inspected by a team of crop scientists and department officials and found that germinated was affected due to moisture stress and not due to defect in seed

Khammam MECH 12 80 hectares After negotiations with the company, the company reportedly agreed to pay the seed cost of Rs 1600/- and cultivation charges of Rs. 350/- per acre to the farmers

Complaints were received from other districts like Karimnagar, Kurnool, Guntur etc., though the decisions of the JDA Committees are not known. Discussions with reliable sources in the Commissionerate of Agriculture revealed that the Appellate Committee also upheld the awards passed by the JDA Committees in the districts. The companies, aggrieved by the decisions, are supposed to have taken the AP government to Court where the government is trying hard to make the companies accountable for the losses incurred by the farmers. This, in spite of an assurance by a Monsanto-Mahyco Biotech official (Mr Shabbir, who is the Territory Manager) in Warangal on October 16th, that the company would abide by the decision taken by the government in this case.

To understand the true picture of Bt Cotton in Andhra Pradesh and in India, it is important to know the whole story, right from the beginning of field trials. There are a variety of versions emerging about the "success" or "failure" of Bt Cotton in India making the picture unclear. However, the complete failure of regulatory framework right from the beginning, as well as the lack of protection for farmers is apparent in the story. The strategies used by the industry and the pro-GE lobby for promoting Bt cotton become clear too from this story. What is also clear from the many versions of the story is the extremely uneven performance of this "frontier technology".

THE PRE-COMMERCIAL RELEASE STORY

Field Trials unscientific and illegal:

During the Bt Cotton field trials itself, the future of GE crops in India was set legal violations and unscientific studies shrouded in secrecy became the norm since then.

In March 1995, Monsanto's Indian partner imported 100 grams of Bt Cotton seed after obtaining permission from the Review Committee of Genetic Manipulation (RCGM) under the Department of Biotechnology under the Ministry of Science and Technology. Organisations like RFSTE objected to this as a legal violation since the Environment Protection Act 1986 which governs GMO-related issues in India requires that GEAC (Genetic Engineering Approval Committee) of Ministry of Environment and Forests grant permission for importing genetically engineered substances (the seeds in this case).

In 1998, Monsanto-Mahyco Biotech received approval from the RCGM of the Department of Biotechnology to conduct countrywide field trials in 85 hectares. There was also approval provided to produce seed from 150 hectares. In 1999, Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology (RFSTE) field a case in the Supreme Court challenging the legality of the approval given by the RCGM since such an approval falls under the purview of the GEAC. They also challenged the lack of biosafety procedures during the trials. Even as the case continued to be heard in the Court, in 2000, Monsanto-Mahyco was allowed by the DBT large scale, multi-centric open field trials including seed production in various states of the country. These trials were done in 40 sites in 6 states. Once again, there was a legal violation in this since large scale field trials have to be permitted by GEAC and not the DBT. Further, the trials were undertaken in great secrecy. In some cases, even the farmers on whose
fields the trials were undertaken did not know that they were growing a genetically engineered crop. During the trials, the isolation distances maintained were insufficient. The state governments were also not aware of the trials going on and in 1999 Andhra Pradesh government prohibited the field trials from taking place in the state. There were also serious objections raised by activists about the fact that post harvest management and safety issues were completely ignored during the field trials.

The number of years of field trials upon which to base the approval for commercial cultivation was lesser than scientifically accepted. While six years of trials are needed in other countries, in India, Bt Cotton was tested as trials for only four years.

Further, the trials were not open for independent scrutiny. Trials done on very small plots of land were sought to be extrapolated into the farmers’ situation and growing conditions. This was simply unacceptable and based on a variety of objections, the GEAC also ordered one more year of trials in 2001. MMB then began trials in seven states on 100 hectares. ICAR also conducted trials in 11 locations.

Among the major lacunae pointed out in the MMB field trials were the risk of genetic pollution and contamination through cross-pollination and hybridisation (in the study of the distance Bt pollen could fly, data showed a large variation between two and 15 metres, a 7,500 per cent margin of variation), the impact of Bt toxin on non-target beneficial species (while it was pointed out that the study showed zero impact of Bt toxin on populations of beneficial species, no beneficial species seem to have been involved in the study), and emergence of resistance in the target bollworm species (no study seems to have been done on insect resistance to Bt). In socio-economic terms, Bt cotton did not compare well with other alternatives particularly in the control of such pests as the bollworm (the data submitted did not tally with the claim of increased yields and cost reductions).

Strategy of "Contamination First, Approval Next"

In a manner that is almost pre-meditated, the GE industry's advance in many parts of the world has been similar contaminate first and then press for approval.

In late 2001, news erupted that in Gujarat, large tracts of cotton land have been planted by Bt Cotton varieties that had not received any approval for commercial cultivation. A Bt Cotton variety called "Navbharat 151" of Navbharat Seeds Private Limited was grown on nearly 10000 hectares, reports revealed. It was also revealed that this variety was in use from 2-3 years prior to that. In 2001, farmers were seen to be growing open pollinated seed collected from the variety grown in the previous season. Several seed companies of Gujarat appealed to the DBT to take immediate action against the spread of Navbharat 151 because "the spread of unauthenticated and illegal seeds carried serious risks and would have grave consequences for Indian farmers and Indian agriculture". The Ministry of Environment and Forests through GEAC got a sample of the Navbharat seeds tested for the Cry 1ac gene and the results were positive, confirming that the seeds were genetically engineered. Navbharat Seeds
had not sought or got any approval for producing and selling GE seeds. It was also reported that Navbharat Seeds was also producing Navbharat 151 under the name of Jay, Vijay and Digvijay in Andhra Pradesh.

GEAC, after its team came back from its inspection of Navbharat seeds, ordered the uprooting and burning of Bt cotton crop to destroy it. Seed production plots and harvested seeds were also ordered to be destroyed. In its orders asking for destruction of material related to Navbharat 151 Bt Cotton, the GEAC admitted to several potential risks and said that the destruction is to ensure safety to environment and human health and to obviate any possibility of cross pollination. It also pointed out that the effect of the genetically modified cotton like allergenicity and other factors on mammals is not tested. This Order of the GEAC dated 18th October 2001 also invoked the precautionary principle and also brought up the issue of compensation payable to farmers who have unwittingly used this product.

On 31st October 2001, it was decided to procure the cotton which had already reached the market, destroy the seeds, storage the lint, procure cotton from the standing crop also, to be ginned and the seeds to be destroyed. Complete destruction of the crop residue by uprooting, burning and sanitation of the fields was also ordered.

Navbharat Seeds Pvt Ltd challenged the GEAC Order in the Delhi High Court saying that their Navbharat 151 cotton variety was developed by using conventional plant breeding method. The source of Bt in the Navbharat variety has not been resolved to this day. It has to be mentioned here that Dr D B Desai of Navbharat Company is a former employee of Mahyco. Soon afterwards, in March 2002, Bollgard Bt Cotton was given permission for commercial cultivation in six states of India. One of the arguments heard at that time was when there is so much illegal Bt Cotton growing in several states of the country, is there any point in holding back approval for the Monsanto-Mahyco varieties?

It has to be pointed out that this phenomenon of contamination and growing of GE varieties illegally without approval even while some varieties are in the pipeline for approval has not been uncommon in recent times. Even in other countries like Brazil and Thailand, such an approach was attempted. The companies involved including the company which imported the original seeds and the government bodies regulating the import and trials have a lot to answer for about how this whole growth in illegal Bt Cotton began and spread.

Bt Cotton Approved for Conditional Commercial Cultivation in 6 States:

In March 2002, the Genetic Engineering Approval Committee of the MoEF approved the commercial cultivation of three Mahyco hybrids transformed with the Bollgard Bt gene from Monsanto. The approval is questionable since there were legal cases going on against the approval of field trials themselves. GEAC also showed a turn-around from its views expressed soon after the Navbharat illegal Bt cotton case erupted. It was also pointed out that in the meeting where the approval was granted, two important representatives from the Health Ministry and from the Agriculture Ministry in the GEAC were not present.

There were numerous conditions imposed for this approval uptil March 2005 (provided in this report as Annexure 1) but surprisingly, Monsanto-Mahyco was entrusted certain responsibilities related to monitoring and regulatory related aspects there is a clear conflict of interest in these roles and it is inexplicable how GEAC could not anticipate such a conflict of interest. For instance, Mahyco will monitor the susceptibility of the Bollworm to Bt and submit data on resistance development, if any, to GEAC.

The first year: 2002-03

Bt Cotton in its Bollgard brand name was sold at Rs. 1600/- per combo pack, which consists of 450 grams of Bt and 120 grams of non-Bt seed of the same variety. The other popular non-Bt hybrids cost around Rs. 400/- to 450/-. The state-wise distribution of the cultivation of Bt Cotton in its first year of commercial cultivation is given below.

Commercial cultivation of Bt cotton hybrids in India, 2002 (hectares):
State MECH-12 MECH-162 MECH-184 Total
Maharashtra 112 9,300 5,334 14,746
Madhya Pradesh 60 404 1,756 2,220
Karnataka ”” 3,828 80 3,908
Andhra Pradesh 44 5,564 ”” 5,608
Gujarat 76 4,136 4,642 8,854
Tamil Nadu ”” 2,042 660 2,702
Total 292 25,274 12,472 38,038

As can be seen, MECH 162 was grown in the largest extent in this year, and almost all of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka went in for this hybrid amongst the three approved varieties. The largest extent of approved Bt Cotton grown in its first year of commercialization was in Maharashtra, followed by Gujarat.

Right from the first year, the companies promoting Bt Cotton had to go on the defensive about their product. As early as June 2002, soon after sowing, there were reports about farmers not meeting refuge criteria in many places.

Almost at the very beginning of the season, the first complaints came from Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. While the AP reports were about the vulnerability of the Bt varieties to leaf curl virus and jassids, the MP report was about failure of Bt Cotton crop in Khargone district including the costs of Bt Cotton being exorbitantly high.

That was only the beginning. Through out the season, there were reports from all the states, including from Maharashtra. In September and again in November, RFSTE (Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology) brought out findings from its survey in the three states of Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. These reports said that not only did Bt Cotton mean the emergence of new pests and diseases but that it failed to control the bollworm too for which it has been designed. The following are the findings from RFSTE's study:

* False claims of pest resistance: cases of substantial attack of bollworm in the states of Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra were found. There was also a 250-300% increase in non-target pests like jassids, aphids and thrips. Bt cotton has been attacked by wilt and root rot in Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Karnataka as per the study
* False claims of higher yields: Bt Cotton was sold with many promises made by the company in its propaganda with farmers. Higher yields of upto 15 quintals per acre were promised, whereas the average yields of Bt Cotton as per this study were 1.2 quintals per acre in Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh. The study found that nowhere did Bt Cotton yields cross more than 4 quintals per acre at the end of the harvest. The average yield in Madhya Pradesh worked out to be 4.01 quintals per acre while in Karnataka it was 3.82 quintals per hectare. During the field visit time for the study, the Bt Cotton plants had leaves that turned red before dropping off
* False claims of higher income: Incomes of Bt Cotton farmers were affected not only by lower yields but because of the prices fetched by the bt cotton in the market the staple length was lower than promised (only about 15-20 mm)

Many other studies emerged from different parts of the Bt Cotton growing states reinforcing the picture. This was the case with Karnataka, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh as well as Andhra Pradesh.

In Andhra Pradesh:

The following is the picture of Bt Cotton sales within the state of Andhra Pradesh in the first year where MECH 162 Bt was planned to be marketed almost exclusively with some negligible quantities of MECH 12 Bt.

Sl No Name of the District Number of Packets Sold Number of Farmers Number of Villages Apprx Area covered (acres)
1 Adilabad 1442 866 235 1237
2 RR District/Medak 501 268 43 506
3 Vizianagaram 183 142 25 162
4 Mahbubnagar 548 196 50 427
5 Prakasam 148 124 18 96
6 Nalgonda 708 413 87 505
7 Khammam 1472 591 204 710
8 East Godavari 98 83 32 31
9 Karimnagar 1136 1286 279 1539
10 Guntur 1281 1373 208 1412
11 Warangal 1576 1284 272 1397
12 Krishna 100 184 36 139
13 Kurnool 148 119 31 126
9341 6929 1520 8287
Source: Dept of Agriculture, GoAP

In AP, Mahbubnagar saw some farmers go in for large extents of Bt Cotton cultivation and some of the most devastating stories emerged from there by the end of the season. One of the first cases of suicide by a Bt Cotton farmer also emerged from there.

The RFSTE study worked out the economics of growing Bt Cotton in one acre, in terms of input costs, yields and output value and found that Bt Cotton farmers were incurring losses of upto Rs. 6400/acre on an average.

Cost-Benefit Analysis of Bt Cotton Vs Other Cotton in one acre in Maharashtra & Andhra Pradesh:

Bt Cotton Non Bt Hybrids Desi Varieties
A. Expenditure on Inputs (Seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation etc.) Rs. 9700/- Rs. 5750/- None
B. Total Yield 2 quintals 10 quintals 5 quintals
C. Output Value Rs. 3300/- Rs. 16500/- Rs. 8250/-
C A Loss of Rs. 6400/acre Saving of Rs. 10750/acre Saving of Rs. 8250/acre

Gene Campaign's study:

A Bt cotton evaluation study carried out in Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh by a Delhi-based agricultural policy think tank, Gene Campaign, reported complete failure of the crop in both the States. The study showed that 60 per cent of the farmers did not recover costs and that most of them incurred a loss of Rs.80 an acre. The input costs for Bt cotton sown on an acre are about Rs.1,000 higher than that for non-Bt cotton. The seed cost per acre is four times that of quality non-Bt varieties. The savings on pesticides is a mere Rs.217 an acre, while the seed cost, including the licence fee for using the patented Bt seeds, is Rs.1,200 higher.

Farm Type Non Bt Cotton Bt Cotton
Farmers (%) Income/Acre (Rs.) Net Profit/ Acre (Rs.) Farmers (%) Income (Rs) Net Profit / Acre (Rs.)
Low Yielding 35 7394 2661 60 5637 (-) 79
Medium Yielding 58 12512 7779 35 9737 4021
High Yielding 07 20475 15742 05 15375 9659

According to the study, in most cases Bt cotton did not resist even the bollworm, and farmers had to spray the same quantity of pesticides for both Bt and non-Bt crops. The study also showed that cotton traders in the two States were not buying Bt cotton; they prefer non-Bt varieties such as Brahma and Banny. Some farmers seem to be mixing Bt cotton with non-Bt varieties to sell off the former.

However, the most shocking fact, according to the Gene Campaign study, is that neither Andhra Pradesh nor Maharashtra has set up the regulatory authority mandated by the 1989 Environmental Protection Act to oversee the cultivation of genetically modified crops.

In their analysis about the causes for failure of Bt Cotton, Gene Campaign attributes a few reasons for the failure:

* expression of Bt gene is uneven in the plants (with the top portions having a higher expression whereas the lower nodes are more susceptible to pest attack)
* inadequate endotoxin production under harsh environmental conditions like drought where only a sub-lethal dose is produced
* refuge maintenance for resistance management leads to wasting of land making Bt cotton non-viable especially for small farmers
* susceptibility to pink boll worm attack
* Bt varieties developed from hybrids which were themselves moderate to poor yielders

Department of Agriculture, Government of AP Study:

The Commissioner of Agriculture in the Department of Agriculture also came up with a performance report of Bt Cotton during Kharif 2002 which was submitted to the Ministry of Environment and Forests. This was a report that looked at the performance of MECH 12 Bt and MECH 162 Bt. In that year, as against 650,317 hectares of cotton crop cultivated in the state, 3315 hectares were covered with Bt Cotton (about 0.5%).

Following media reports on the failure of Bt Cotton, the department of agriculture conducted a farmer-wise survey on the performance of Bt Cotton through the Joint Directors of Agriculture in all the Bt Cotton growing districts of the state. The criteria fixed for evaluation of performance were mainly incidence of bollworm and sucking pests, yields obtained and quality of lint. The results of this survey are given in a table that follows the summary of the survey below:

Incidence of Bollworm
Low to Moderate.
Incidence was less during the year and hence advantage of Bt Cotton could not be assessed correctly

Incidence of sucking pests
Moderate to high
Maturity 30-45 days earlier to non-Bt
Average number of bolls per plant and size 30-32 bolls/plant, compared to 28-30 bolls/plant in other hybrids. Boll size is relatively small (3 to 4 grams)

Yield
Low yields compared to indigenous popular hybrids. Majority of farmers got less than 5 qtls/acre whereas indigenous hybrids have recorded more than 5 qtls/acre under well managed conditions
Staple length 24-26 mm

Market Value
Majority of farmers are of the opinion that due to short staple length of lint, less price of Rs 150/- to Rs. 200/- per quintal of kapas were offered. Farmers are finding it difficult in selling their produce.

While there were 6949 farmers who went in for Bt Cotton in 2003-04 in Andhra Pradesh as per the Sales figures of Monsanto-Mahyco, the department’s survey covered 3709 of these farmers. This continues to be the largest survey of Bt Cotton performance in the country to this day. For this survey, the department used the following classification for Yields: Low below 5 quintals/acre; Medium 5-10 quintals/acre and High 10 quintals and above per acre. Similarly, market value was considered Poor where it was Rs. 1800 to Rs. 2000/- per quintal, and considered Good where it was Rs. 2000/- and above per quintal. The results were damning.

District Farmers surveyed Incidence of Bollworm Incidence of Sucking pests Yields compared to local hybrids Quality of produce Market Value
L M H L M H L M H Good Poor Avg Poor
Vizianagaram 58 19 12 27 30 25 3 55 3 0 0 58 0 58
East Godavari 27 5 18 4 2 5 20 24 3 19 0 27 0 27
Krishna 137 95 13 29 56 16 65 37 70 11 0 137 2 135
Guntur 967 290 468 209 340 299 328 731 213 30 0 967 6 961
Prakasam 82 70 7 5 28 40 14 70 5 10 0 82 0 82
Kurnool 92 26 33 23 18 42 32 41 36 15 0 92 15 77
Rangareddy 117 26 58 33 0 42 75 117 0 12 0 117 0 117
Medak 12 12 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 12
Nalgonda 169 79 22 68 61 12 96 95 65 9 4 165 10 159
Mahbubnagar 129 10 97 22 0 129 0 129 0 0 0 129 0 129
Khammam 291 37 152 102 55 131 106 150 117 24 0 291 25 266
Karimnagar 585 163 160 252 153 166 258 513 59 3 0 575 16 559
Warangal 891 253 204 434 191 198 502 527 314 50 32 859 278 613
Adilabad 152 140 2 10 15 86 51 143 7 2 0 153 4 148
TOTAL 3709 1225 1246 1218 961 1191 1550 2632 892 185 36 3664 356 3343

As can be seen, against the question on bollworm incidence, nearly equal numbers of farmers had reported Low, Medium and High incidence, whereas most of the farmers found the incidence of sucking pests in Bt Cotton to be on the higher side. While the marketing blitzkrieg of the company promised Higher Yields in all its propaganda material, a whopping majority of the respondents in this survey (71%) reported Low yields with Bt Cotton (MECH 162 Bt mostly). There were also issues related to the quality of produce including staple length and color of the cotton; therefore, market prices fetched by Bt Cotton were reported to be lower than Rs. 2000/- per quintal. The devastation in districts like Mahbubnagar is apparent from the table above.

Mr Jerome Reddy and Mr Chinnapu Reddy, Fatimapur village, Kothur Mandal, Mahbubnagar district (Interviewed by Greenpeace India on 2/3/03)

Jerome Reddy of Fatimapur village owns around 13 acres of land in the village, and is considered to be one of the progressive farmers of the village. Last season, he experimented with Bollgard, the Bt Cotton variety of Mahyco-Monsanto on 10 acres of his land. Looking back, he regrets the decision, and says that he does not feel good about growing Bt Cotton. His Bt Cotton crop yielded just 1 ½ quintals per acre! In all, he got 15 quintals out of his 10 acres. The exact amount that he was told that he would get, and that he had hoped to get from just one acre of his land with Bt cotton! With the economics working out very adversely, Jerome Reddy, like his brother, Thomas Reddy, is all set to experience a loss that runs into tens of thousands of rupees.

The investment per acre, as per his calculation is around Rs 10,000/- per acre, with the return being Rs 3000/- per acre (the 1 ½ quintals of yield sold at Rs 2000/- per quintal). The investment pattern was like this: on seed, for every acre: Rs 1600/-; on fertilizers (he applied 3 bags of fertilizers): around Rs 1500/-; on pesticides, for spraying Cypermethrin, Monocrotophos, Chlorpyriphos, Ekalux, Endosulfan, “Stop” etc.: Rs 5000/. He also used “tractor pumps” for spraying pesticides. Once the pests appeared, it was uncontrollable, he informed. In the earlier days, when the pest was spotted, he was advised by the company representatives not to resort to spraying. Believing them, he did not spray. But then, the pest attack became intense. Expensive pesticides like Tracer were also resorted to. In addition, he had to spend on agricultural operations like ploughing, sowing, weeding, plucking etc., in addition to spending on irrigation (he irrigated the crop twice during the season).
The net loss per acre, according to him, is around Rs 7000/-. It has failed on the very counts on which promises were made, he said: on low pesticide expenses and on higher yields.

Jerome Reddy and his son, Chinnapu Reddy have some very interesting experiences and stories to share about Bt Cotton.

* in 2001, they were all taken to a neighboring village, Reddypalem, where a large farmer called Rayapu Reddy had agreed to grow Bt Cotton of Mahyco-Monsanto on his land, as part of field trials. The crop on this 10-gunta plot was impressive what was sown on this plot was Mech 12 variety however, and not Mech 162 that was later sold to the farmers; worse yet, the sowing season for the demonstrated variety was delayed by a whole month, knowingly and wrongfully by the Company. Rayapu Reddy was given the seeds only on July 22nd of 2001, while the normal sowing time is in the month of June. Incidentally, neighbors of Rayapu Reddy feel that the incidence of Heliothis was low on his crop during the field trial season because of the adjacent poultry farms with its lights on (these lights attract the insects away from the crops, according to them)

* the boll size of Bt Cotton was very small, and very less cotton in it. The number of seeds per boll was also less around 6-7, compared to a normal rate of 10-15. The number of bolls for Bt Cotton was only 20-30 bolls per plant, whereas other varieties in neighboring fields had nearly 100 bolls per plant. In their crop, the non-Bt refuge did not yield any bolls at all. Further, because of the small size of the boll, the plucking activity of cotton becomes more difficult and labour-intensive. The staple length of Bt is short and they had to plead with buyers to take it. While non-Bt varieties fetched around Rs 2500/- per quintal for other farmers, Bt Cotton fetched only Rs 2000/- per quintal. While the other varieties have more weight per volume, the Bt cotton is lighter and the farmer loses out on this count too, according to them. While non-Bt varieties yielded even without irrigation, the Bt Cotton crop of Thomas Reddy, though he irrigated it around 5-6 times in the last season,
yielded dismally.

* In fact, one other characteristic noticed on the Bt crop was that though it flowers profusely, there is a tendency for the flowers to dry up and fall. Similarly with the bolls.

* The company representatives have stopped visiting them once the crop started showing its true characteristics. When confronted with the utter failure, the company representatives would only ask them to go to Warangal and meet the farmers there who have had good yields.

* Chinnapu Reddy also narrated the story of Ranga Reddy of neighboring Mallapuram village who incurred huge losses and threatened to kill himself with the very pesticides that he had used on the crop. He reported that Ranga Reddy had to sell two of his bullocks and three buffaloes after the Bt losses of last season. Like Jerome Reddy, Ranga Reddy also tried Bt Cotton on a large extent of land, believing in the promises made.

* "The company guys and the dealers came to our doorstep to deliver the seeds. We should have known right then that something was wrong", points out Chinnapu Reddy. One day, before the last cropping season, Chinnapu Reddy came back from the town, to find a large gathering and much activity. There were also reporters from the local papers present. When he went closer he discovered that this was about Bollgard, the "miracle Bt cotton" seed. In this "function", the discussions on the seed were held for one and half hours and more time was spent on a big feast. As Chinnapu Reddy recalls, there was 95 kilos of non-vegetarian food cooked that day and there was biryani and chicken fry. On that very day, "bookings" for the season's seed supply were made by the dealers and the company representatives. "They had thrown parties and people like us thought there must be something in here. And we agreed to buy the seeds. Now, it has brought the farmers nearer to the gates of suicide deaths again",
he remarks.

Mr Akki Ramulu of Mallapuram, Kothur Mandal, Mahbubnagar Dist.

Ramulu had grown Bt Cotton in one acre of land, expecting around 18 quintals of yield per acre as per the promises made to him. He did not get even two quintals of yield!

He, along with other farmers (this village saw around 23-25 acres of Bt cotton sown in the last season, with just one farmer, Ranga Reddy growing on 12 acres of land) were told that no pesticides would be required, he reported. "Pests could not be controlled even with pesticides, leave alone the fact that they will not appear", he remarks. "It has been a complete loss".

It is true that bollworm did not appear for the first three months, he reports, but when it did appear, there was no controlling it. He used Monocrotophos, Ekalux, Pride a couple of times and so on. Sprayed around five times in all and after realizing that the pest cannot be controlled, stopped. He counts himself as the one who got the worst experience from Bt Cotton slightly more than one quintal from his one acre. While he calculates his expenses to be around Rs 12000/- (seed: 1600/; Farm Yard Manure of one tractorload: 3000/; 3 bags of fertilizers one urea and 2 DAP bags: 2000/; pesticides: 2000/; other expenses of ploughing, labor, sowing etc.: 3500/), the return was Rs 2000/- only. He laughs deprecatingly, asked about the return. The net loss is around 10,000/- rupees.

Asked about what he plans to do now, he joins the other farmers around him in saying that they are waiting for the company representatives to turn up in the area again so that they can bash them up and burn their jeeps! He says that this company’s objective is to make farmers lose, with varieties and technologies like this. The despair of the farmers is obvious, with nowhere to turn to. One of them says, "what can we do? Even earlier, when companies cheated the farmers and we got a top executive of XXX company arrested, did he not come out soon after? What can we do if the government is not interested in protecting us"?

Ramulu also shared other interesting information:

- the company representatives used to visit him quite often in the beginning. Then they stopped coming, once the problems started manifesting themselves on the crop. When confronted about the losses, they even promised to give compensation, only to escape and not to be seen again. Another time, they were told that the company would "adjust" the losses against the seed price in the next season and promised to give the Bt cotton seed at a lower price to them the next season. Farmers immediately folded their hands and said that they did not want to touch the seeds ever again!

- Buyers refused to buy the variety separately until mixed with other varieties and sold. The boll size was smaller and the staple length was also shorter

- One of the neighboring farmers said that it was because of the extravagant feasts that the company threw for the farmers that the farmers believed them and lined up for buying the seeds. Now, they know better.

Tirumalreddy Rayapu Reddy and his brother, Melkior Reddy, Reddypalem,
Kothur Mandal, Mahbubnagar District, Andhra Pradesh

It was Rayapu Reddy's Bt Cotton field trial plot of 10 guntas (1/4th of an acre) in 2001 that had drawn many other farmers to the fatal temptation of Bollgard. What they saw that year on the field trial plot was the Mech 12 variety, that too sown in the last week of July. In this country, one of the main objections to the field trials of Bt Cotton prior to 2001, is the unscientificity especially in terms of the sowing time. That is the reason why the GEAC had asked for one more year of trials. The company, of course, resorted to wrongful procedures in 2001 too to get the approval for commercialization.

Rayapu Reddy owns 25 acres of land in the village, and between him and his brother Melkior Reddy, they had sown Bt cotton in 8 acres of land 4 acres each. The yield has not been more than 3 quintals per acre. Worse yet, when they tried to sell their Bt cotton, the price that was quoted was Rs 1300/- only, while other varieties were fetching farmers upto Rs 2400/- per quintal. After they mixed Bt cotton variety with other varieties, buyers were willing to pay upto Rs 1800/-.

They point out that even the labourers in the village were not too keen to work in the Bt fields since the plucking activity from the small bolls is too tedious. The costs on labour for Bt cotton were double than the normal costs on other varieties.

The brothers had also sown other cotton varieties in around five acres of land, and the yield was around ten quintals on an average per acre, last season. And these varieties fetched even uptil Rs 2600/- per quintal for a couple of days in the market.

They found bollworm incidence to be excessively high on Bt Cotton after the first 60-70 days. They had to resort to using pesticides like endosulfan, monocrotophos, cypermethrin and "Tracer". In fact, a highly expensive pesticide like Tracer was used twice to control the pest incidence. They also found that the flowers and bolls would form but soon dry up and fall. Melkior Reddy also opines that the Bt plant itself is not as strong as non-Bt varieties.

The brothers reported about the fact that Monsanto-Mahyco had given them the seeds for the field trial only in the month of July (could sow on July 22nd) in 2001. They feel that with late sowing and the onset of winter, the incidence of bollworm would expectably, be lesser and that is what the company had shown. But in real growing conditions of farmers, they cannot afford to sow late because the incidence of other pests and diseases would be unbearably higher in such a case.

Rayapu Reddy and Melkior Reddy are thoroughly disappointed with the company. While the expenditure was around Rs 12000/- per acre, including the irrigation that they provided to the crop, the yield was just 3 quintals per acre, amounting to returns of around Rs 5400/-. Therefore, there was a net loss of Rs 6600/- per acre, and a total loss of Rs 52,800/- approximately in all the 8 acres.

They point out that the company representatives had stopped coming. When they were confronted by an angry mob of farmers during their last visit, they had promised to give seeds for next season at a lower price. They said, "we can't pay you money since there will be many other who will be asking us for compensation. Therefore, the company can’t pay you money, but we will try and 'adjust' against next season's seed supply". The farmers of course refused to get more Bt seeds. It was only the presence of senior political leaders during the last visit that prevented the company representatives from being bashed up by the farmers, they reported.

We have now experienced that the promises of the company are not true, the brothers say.

There was a huge uproar in the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly with the Congress (I) government, then in the Opposition, demanding compensation for Bt Cotton farmers. Based on their own survey, on March 10 2003, the then Minister for Agriculture in the Government of Andhra Pradesh made a statement in the Assembly admitting that the performance of Bt Cotton has been less than satisfactory. He said that "overall information is that the farmers have not experienced very positive and encouraging results" and that therefore, the farmers need to be compensated. To this, MMB (Monsanto-Mahyco Biotech) said that it will compensate farmers only for failure to germinate and for absence of genetic purity promised by the company and not for yield losses . This response from the company was not questioned by the government and a bad precedent was set, as similar results from 2004-05 would show. The Andhra Pradesh government did not make any changes to its "MoU system" to prevent such responses
from seed companies. The fiasco went unchallenged while the first GE/Bt Cotton farmer in the country committed suicide in Andhra Pradesh in 2003 after the very first season of the commercialization of Bt Cotton.

Acharya N.G. Ranga Agricultural University's Study:

The Regional Agricultural Research Station in Palam, Mahbubnagar district collected data about Bt Cotton performance from 100 farmers of South Telangana districts of Mahbubnagar, Nalgonda, Rangareddy and Medak districts using three main parameters for assessment yields and market rates fetched; expenditure and net income per hectare of Bt Cotton cultivated; and Bt Cotton's ability to resist Bollworm . The survey compared Bt Cotton with other hybrids like Bunny, Brahma, Veda, Savitha etc. The following were the results of this survey.

Yields and Average Market Prices fetched by Bt Cotton and other non-Bt Hybrids,
South Telangana region:
District Yields Quintals per Hectare Market Price Rupees per quintal
Bt Cotton Other Hybrids Bt Cotton Other Hybrids
Mahbubnagar 10.74 19.41 2008.00 2143.00
Nalgonda 10.96 14.50 1923.25 2962.50
Rangareddy 07.36 15.00 1908.16 2226.30
Medak 24.00 19.18 2065.00 2290.00
10.80 16.90 2015.13 2202.41

As the above table shows, except for Medak district, the average yields of non-Bt popular hybrids were much more than the yields from Bt Cotton. The following table presents a picture of the costs and net incomes per hectare from Bt Cotton and non-Bt hybrids from the survey locations.

District Expenditure Rupees per Hectare Net Income Rupees per Hectare
Bt Cotton Other Hybrids Bt Cotton Other Hybrids
Mahbubnagar 20538.66 20165.13 00670.00 20800.00
Nalgonda 17560.08 15849.20 04396.13 15380.16
Rangareddy 19116.68 17036.30 -04404.21 16523.00
Medak 20269.40 18965.40 25078.30 14927.40
19319.43 18069.39 2405.72 18780.81

As the above table shows, the expenditure on growing Bt Cotton did not decrease as the projections seemed to indicate but rather increased. The net income from Bt Cotton was almost negligible compared to other hybrids. In fact, in Rangareddy district, the survey found that farmers have negative incomes from growing Bt Cotton.

The most important finding of this study was that the average number of pesticide sprays with the use of Bt Cotton was only one spray lesser than non-Bt hybrids. While 61% of the farmers surveyed found that Bt Cotton was effective against bollworm upto 100 days, the remaining farmers found no difference in this aspect between Bt and non-Bt. Since the pesticides used were of the expensive categories, the average costs did not reflect a great deal of difference. The study also found that the cost of plucking was higher in the case of Bt Cotton. Only in Medak district, Bt Cotton gave more incomes to the farmers than non-Bt hybrids, as per this survey. The study also found that Bt Cotton was unable to withstand water/moisture stress.

The report from this survey points out that even though the company would like to call the 2002-03 season as being adverse in general, other hybrids had performed quite well.

The Acharya N G Ranga Agriculture University (ANGRAU) authorities had also conducted a detailed survey to evaluate the performance of Bt Cotton which as an agro-climatic zone-wise survey. The salient findings from their evaluation include:

*with non-Bt hybrids was not possible by the time of the evaluation since pickings were not completed in non-Bt Cotton. However, the number of sprays on Bt Cotton were more, averaging 6-7 sprays per acre. This zone includes districts like Guntur, Krishna and Prakasam.

*In the North Telangana zone, it was found that cost of cultivation in the case of Bt Cotton was slightly more compared to the non-Bt varieties. The net returns from Bt Cotton were too low compared to non-Bt Cotton (Rs. 4800/- and Rs. 14880/- per hectare respectively); here, the surveys revealed that 90% of the farmers who raised Bt Cotton during 2002 have expressed their unwillingness to raise Bt Cotton in the following season citing small sized bolls, poor vigour, lack of rejuvenation, short staple length, low yield potential and low market value as the reasons. This zone consists of districts like Warangal, Khammam, Adilabad and Karimnagar.

*The South Telangana results were similar (presented in this report in the preceding section).

*In Kurnool district of the scarce rainfall zone, farmers felt that Bt Cotton possessed resistance to bollworm but MECH 162 Bt did not have sufficient yield potential compared to other hybrids. The net returns obtained per hectare in Bt Cotton here were Rs. 16800/- whereas non-Bt was Rs. 22300/-.

There was also a brief ('preliminary') report filed by the Director of Research of ANGRAU, Dr Padmaraju, on the performance of Bt Cotton in Mahabubnagar district based on the observations of university scientists in the farmers' fields. As per this report, the difference in the average number of sprays between Bt Cotton and non-Bt Cotton is just 2 sprays. The report points out that the 'expenditure saved in plant protection is taken away by high seed cost'. This report records that Bt cotton bolls are relatively small in size, that the staple length is less in Bt Cotton and the price offered for Bt Cotton kapas is Rs. 100 to Rs. 200 less as compared to other varieties. The report admits that the pest load was not much that season (2002-03) and hence, correct assessment could not be made. The pest load was noticed to be less in initial stages of crop growth as evidenced by higher number of bolls in Bt Cotton as against refugia. Healthy growth of Helicoverpa was noticed in later stages
of crop growth. The report concludes by saying that it is based on preliminary observations and that the performance has to be studied in farmers' fields for at least three years to arrive at a valid conclusion.

Telangana Natural Resource Management Group’s (TNRMG) Public Hearing:

A team of eminent scientists comprising of K R Chowdhary, Prasada Rao and S. Jeevananda Reddy met with farmers from villages like Mallapur, Fatimapur, Gudur, Reddypalem, Cheguru and Narsappagudem in Mahbubnagar district along with farmers from Rangareddy and Adilabad districts in the month of December 2002. Most of these farmers had tales of devastation to share with the scientists, after one season of growing Bt Cotton in its first season of commercialization.

Later, on 29th July 2003, TNRMG organized a public hearing in Hyderabad where farmers who cultivated Bt Cotton, agricultural administrators, agricultural scientists, NGO representatives, seed industry representatives, lawyers etc., presented their case in front of a 3-member panel. It was clear from the sharing by farmers that there was no significant reduction in cost of cultivation, no yield benefit in particular, that the bolls were small with more seeds, the lint and staple length were short as compared to other regions, that there was lower price realization and overall loss of income by farmers who opted for Bt Cotton cultivation. The Panel, in its conclusions stated that the government cannot absolve itself of responsibilities as both Central and State governments have permitted the cultivation of this variety. Under the Principle of Promissory Estoppel, the government has to come to the rescue of the farmers, the Panel judged. They clearly concluded that the situation calls
for compensating the farmers for losses suffered due to the cultivation of the Bt Cotton variety.

"Did Bt Cotton Save Farmers in Warangal District?": Study by Andhra Pradesh Coalition in Defence of Diversity (APCIDD) and Deccan Development Society (DDS)

This study covered a set of farmers who were monitored for a season long study, another set for a mid-season study and a third and larger group for an end-of-the-season survey. In all, the study drew its findings from around 225 farmers who took up Bt Cotton cultivation in Warangal district.
According to the study, the Bt hybrid was most affected by the prevailing weather conditions (hot and dry). It was also evident that though the Bt cotton plants produced more bolls, these suffered from heavy premature drying as well as boll shedding. MECH Bt 162, which constituted 98% of the Bt cotton grown, appeared to be characterised by small boll size and short staple length, which affected market preference as well as the price of seed cotton. Another important finding was Bt cotton contained more seeds than non-Bt hybrids, which affected the lint to seed ratio as well as its price. In addition, pickings from the non-Bt crop extended till March, as compared with late December/early January for the Bt cotton in most areas, which reduced the yield of the Bt cotton crop.

Early sucking pests like aphids and jassids were absent in both the Bt and non-Bt plants during the first 30 to 35 days after germination, as all the hybrid seed sold in the market is pretreated with the pesticide Imidacloprid. But, from early October, when the crop was 80 to 90 days old, moderate to heavy infestation of aphids and white flies was reported throughout the area, more prominently on Bt than on non Bt crop. But from November, the bollworm infestation increased in both the Bt and non-Bt crops, with 81% of non-Bt and 71% of Bt farmers pointing the finger at the bollworm as the pest that did the most damage to their crop. Most farmers concurred that sucking pests attacked the Bt crop more than the non-Bt crop. Therefore, even though the incidence of bollworm was slightly lower, the level of pesticide use was almost identical for Bt and non-Bt farmers.

Qualitative differences in Bt and non-Bt cotton crops
Characteristic Bt cotton Conventional hybrid
Flowering 15-20 days earlier 15-20 days later
Plant height 90-110cm 115-130 cm
Boll size Smaller Larger
Number of bolls/plant 40-45 more 40-45 less
Premature drying and shedding of bolls More Less
Tolerance to abiotic stress Poor Moderate
Staple length Short Long
Number seeds/boll 30-35 16-20
Pest incidence Bollworm 71% 81%
Pest incidence -Sucking pests 29% 19%
Number of pickings Less More

The economics of Bt and non-Bt production show that farmers who cultivated Bt cotton spent 15% of the total cost of cultivation on the seed as against 5% in case of non-Bt farmers, in the hope that it would reduce their spending on pesticide sprays and improve their yields substantially. But in reality, expenditure on plant protection was only around 25 rupees/ha less for Bt cotton farmers. Non-Bt cotton farmers averaged a yield of 276 kg/ha compared with 180 kg/ha for Bt cotton farmers, which represents a net 35% decrease in yield. So, in spite of spending 3.5 times more on pesticide-resistant seed, a Bt farmer had only a 4% reduction in pesticide costs, and ended up with a 35 % loss in final yield.

These losses were compounded by the fact that the market value of Bt cotton was lower than non-Bt. To offset the reduction in the price of Bt seed cotton, almost all farmers resorted to mixing both Bt and non-Bt cotton before marketing. In the end, non-Bt cotton farmers netted four times as much as Bt farmers from their 2002-2003 cotton crop. Some 71% of Bt cotton farmers experienced losses, compared with 18% of non-Bt farmers.

The economics of cultivating Bt and non-Bt cotton
Characteristic Bt Popular hybrids
Total cost of cultivation/ha Rs 4,262 Rs 3,825
Cost of seed/ha Rs 640 Rs 180-200
Expenditure on pesticides/ha Rs. 1,164 Rs. 1,188
% of total expenditure spent on plant protection 27 % 31 %
Average yields/ha 180 kg 276 kg
Market price/100 kg seed cotton Rs 2,080 Rs 2,164
Net returns/ha at the end of cropping season Rs 518 Rs 2147
No of farmers who profited 65 (29%) 185 (82%)
* Up to Rs 5,000 ($108) 39 (17%) 67 (30%)
* Rs 5,000-7,500 ($108-162) 4 (2%) 28 (12%)
* Rs 7,500-10,000 ($162-216) 9 (4%) 20 (9%)
* Rs >10,000 (>$216) 13 (6%) 70 (31%)

The Company's response:

Following the initial reports of failure of Bt Cotton, Mahyco and Monsanto came out with a response in the month of November 2002 itself saying that "there has been no failure of the GM technology" rather, the GM cotton like non-GM cotton hybrids has been affected by "new wilt" (also called as 'parawilt'). MMB said that the phenomenon noticed was a physiological disorder which occurred when cotton hybrids were exposed to prolonged dry spells followed by heavy showers or high temperature during the formation of cotton bolls. "Since Bt Cotton had more bolls, the environmental stress on them was more and the wilt was more evident", the company explained.

The company also discounted studies like that of Gene Campaign and presented its own survey findings. MMB had surveyed 1090 farmers in 52 districts across 6 states and found that 65% of the farmers had expressed their satisfaction with Bt Cotton, reported 65-70% reduction in pesticide usage and have also obtained a 30% increase in yields. It also claimed that there is no evidence of field level resistance to pink bollworms yet. The company also reported that a massive education programme in 6 states has been conducted with 5000 farmer meetings in the villages with trained staff.

The following is the data from the survey done by MMB . As per this, a yield increase of 8.1 quintals of cotton and a reduction of 1.93 sprays result from growing Bt Cotton. These two factors contribute to an average additional income of more than Rs. 18000/ha according to the company.
Bt cotton results from kharifa 2002 season, June-December (yield in quintalsb):
State Non-Bt yield Bt yield Yield increase with Bt Non-Bt sprays Bt sprays Spray reduction with Bt Economic benefit per hectarec
Andhra Pradesh 14.42(5-25) 20.52(12.5-32.5) 6.10 4.81(1-8) 2.08(0-4) 2.73 Rs.16,747
Gujarat 19.80(3.7-37.5) 28.35(10-44) 8.55 3.42(1-7) 2.09(0-5) 1.33 Rs.18,430
Karnataka 10.50(1.3-30) 17.82(7.5-40) 7.32 2.53(0-6) 1.00(0-3) 1.53 Rs.16,170
Madhya Pradesh 15.00(10-50) 25.82(35-62.5) 10.82 3.29(1-9) 0.93(0-3) 2.36 Rs.24,000
Maharashtra 14.47(2.5-45) 20.82(2.5-62.5) 6.35 2.78(0-7) 0.99(0-4) 1.79 Rs.14,490
Tamil Nadud ”” ”” ”” ”” ”” ”” ””
Total 13.25 21.35 8.10 3.10 1.17 1.93 Rs.18,130

Note. All figures given in the table are based on a survey conducted by Mahyco in the six states where Bt cottonseed cotton was sold in the kharif 2002 season.a The total sample size was 1,069 farmers. Averages are on weighted average basis. Figures in parentheses represent the range for yield (quintals per hectare) and number of sprays.a Kharif refers to a crop that is harvested at the beginning of winter; b 1 quintal = 100 kg.c Economic benefit per hectare was calculated on the basis of an average cotton rate of Rs.2,000/q and an average cost of each bollworm complex spray of Rs.1,000/ha.d Cotton picking still in progress in Tamil Nadu at date of writing.
On 5th March 2003, the government of Andhra Pradesh admitted that Bt Cotton did not give positive and encouraging results, and that farmers need to be compensated. This was followed by the company openly announcing that it will not pay any compensation.

Later, in the month of July 2003, under continued pressure, the then Minister for Agriculture, Mr Vadde Sobhanadeeswara Rao of Andhra Pradesh expressed his government’s helplessness when it comes to seeking a ban on the sale of Bt Cotton. He was of the opinion that the state government has done its job by sending a detailed report of the failure of the crop to GEAC. "We submitted it without any prejudice or favour. We cannot go beyond it", he said.

Following this, the company and the government got into an agreement for Bt Cotton seed to be sold at the reduced price of Rs 1200/- per packet instead of Rs. 1600/-. The dealer commission of Rs. 400/- would be foregone and the company was agreeable to this, media reports indicated.

Greenpeace India's Expose - "Government lies to the Nation":

Even before the full picture of the performance of Bt Cotton emerged from various states and even as NGOs and environmental activists were trying to highlight the losses that farmers incurred in many places, the Minister for Environment and Forests, Government of India, Mr T R Baalu gave a statement in the Parliament that Bt Cotton had shown a "satisfactory performance" in its first year of commercial cultivation. This statement is based on a few farms visited in flying visits by GEAC team members along with the state agriculture officials in the six states where approval was granted. This was a case of "rural development tourism" as described by Robert Chambers. An investigation was carried out by Greenpeace India into the GEAC team's visit and their report from the visit in the state of Andhra Pradesh. The Greenpeace team visited the same farmers as the GEAC team and found that the statement of the Minister for Environment and Forests on December 16 2002 is a gross
misrepresentation of farmers' experience.

While other studies and surveys during this season tried to assess the performance of Bt Cotton, the Greenpeace investigation was about the gross falsification of data that the government was indulging in. This expose "Government lies to the Nation" revealed that the expert team was directed and managed by Monsanto-Mahyco, that the number of farmers who were met was very small compared to the number of farmers who grew Bt Cotton; that there was no rationale for the sample chosen or the sample size except probably convenience and guidance by the company; that farmers who have had a bad experience with Bt Cotton have not been met; that the scope of assessment was too narrow; and that even in cases where farmers have been met, data was misrepresented.

A further investigation in Karnataka revealed similar falsification of records by the government department in Haveri district.

The nexus and the pressure on the government became clearer with all this evidence. While this was the case specifically with regard to Andhra Pradesh, reports poured in about the extremely uneven performance of Bt Cotton throughout the season from other states too. The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Agriculture had asked the Centre to re-evaluate the economic viability of Bt cotton. A six-member panel set up by the Gujarat government under Joint Director, Agriculture (Oilseeds), S.K. Sangami, to evaluate the performance of Bt cotton in the State, said that "it is unfit for cultivation and should be banned in the State".